There is a well-developed literature on trust. 1 Distrust, on the other hand, has gathered far less attention in the philosophical literature (though there is a burgeoning business literature on the topic 2 ). A recent exception to that trend in the philosophical literature is Hawley (2014Hawley ( , 2015 who develops a unified account of both trust and distrust. My aim in this paper is to present arguments against her account of trust and distrust, though then to also suggest a patch.
Suppose we are in the Wild West. In town, there is an uneasy truce, a semblance of law and order. Out in the desert, as everyone knows, there are no holds barred; you take your life into your hands if you venture there. You and I meet by chance in the desert, and you see that I am armed (of course). Before we exchange words, you may try to predict whether or not I will let you live. But no matter how confident you are in that prediction, it's not appropriate for you either to trust or to distrust me in this respect. Out here, no one has promised, implicitly or explicitly, to respect life and limb. I have no commitment to let you live, and you should neither trust or distrust me in this respect. If I let you live, I do not demonstrate trustworthiness; if I shoot you, I display many vices, but not that of untrustworthiness. (Hawley, 2014: 18-19) I return the same verdict as Hawley: that of neither being trusted nor distrusted to let my potential combatant live.
This follows simply from the fact that there are (seemingly) no commitments to be recognised when it comes to shooting in this context.
Conclusion
Hawley (2014) demonstrates that her commitment account of trust has a good deal to recommend it. Here I offer some cases that suggest that it is incomplete, though then attempt to provide a patch to help complete the analysis.
There may be other problems facing Hawley's view, but my patched version of her commitment account of contractual trust is at least a going concern. 10 
